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RE JECT IO N IST ISLAM ISM IN SAUD I ARAB IA :
TH E STO R Y O F JUH AYM AN AL -↪UTAYB I
REV IS IT ED
The storming of the Mecca mosque by Juhayman al-↪Utaybi and his fellow rebels in
November 1979 represents one of the most spectacular events in the modern history of
Saudi Arabia. Yet, it is one of the least understood. Even decades after the event, many
important questions remain unanswered. Who were the rebels, and what did they want?
Why and how did Juhayman’s group come into existence?1 What happened with the
rebels and their ideas after the Mecca events? This article seeks to shed light on the
story and legacy of Juhayman al-↪Utaybi with new information gathered from extensive
fieldwork in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.
Whereas the details of the Mecca operation are relatively well known, the origin of the
rebel group is shrouded in mystery.2 The existing literature on Juhayman’s movement is
both sparse and contradictory. The interested student will find few in-depth studies of it
in English.3 The Arabic-language literature on Juhayman is somewhat more extensive
and has certainly been underexploited by Western academics, but many works suffer
from inaccuracies and political bias.4 A key problem has been the absence of good
primary sources, which has made it virtually impossible for historians to trace the origin
and history of Juhayman’s movement in any significant detail. This changed in 2003,
when Nasir al-Huzaymi, a former associate of Juhayman al-↪Utaybi, lifted the veil on his
past and wrote a series of articles in the Saudi press about his experience as a member of
Juhayman’s group.5 Al-Huzaymi had been active in the organization between 1976 and
1978 but left a year before the Mecca operation. He was caught in the police roundup
after the event and spent eight years in prison. Al-Huzaymi has renounced his former
Islamist convictions and now works as a journalist for the Saudi newspaper al-Riyadh.
Al-Huzaymi is one of several former Islamist radicals in Saudi Arabia who, from
the late 1990s onward, began speaking publicly about their experiences as activists.6
Although their emergence at this particular point in time was facilitated by the process
of limited liberalization initiated by Crown Prince ↪Abdallah in 1999 and to some extent
exploited by authorities as a counterbalance to conservative Islamist forces, it was by no
means orchestrated by the state. These repentants had emerged gradually in independent
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communities and began speaking out before 9/11 or the 2003 terrorist campaign in Saudi
Arabia. There are strong reasons to take al-Huzaymi’s testimony seriously. His account
is descriptive, unflattering toward the authorities, and above all consistent with other
key historical sources.
The current article is based on a detailed reading of the available English- and Arabic-
language literature about Juhayman, as well as on extensive fieldwork. During a series
of research visits to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the authors of this article interviewed
Nasir al-Huzaymi and several other former Saudi Islamists with in-depth knowledge
of the Juhayman movement and phenomenon. By means of a generous intermediary,
we obtained the testimony of a senior Medina-based cleric who was very close to
Juhayman’s group in the 1970s and attended the Grand Mosque during the 1979 siege.
We traced the anonymous authors of the main Arabic books about Juhayman al-↪Utaybi
published in the early 1980s to identify and assess their primary sources.7 We also spoke
to journalists who covered the Juhayman story in the Mecca area in 1979. During this
two-year research process, we were able to collect the accounts of several individuals, in
addition to Nasir al-Huzaymi, who were either part of Juhayman’s group or eyewitnesses
to key events in the group’s history.
Our article is divided into three parts. The first and most voluminous part is devoted
to the history of Juhayman’s movement leading up to the storming of the Mecca mosque
in 1979. In the second part, we will reflect on the nature of this movement and evaluate
existing theories and interpretations of the phenomenon. Finally, we shall examine
the ideological legacy of Juhayman al-↪Utaybi and his influence on subsequent radical
movements in Saudi Arabia up to the present day. The article presents two central
arguments. The first is that our research shows that the group that stormed the Mecca
mosque in 1979 was a radicalized fraction of a much broader pietistic organization set
up in Medina in the mid-1960s under the name of al-Jama↪a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba
(JSM), that is, the Salafi Group that Commands Right and Forbids Wrong. The
second main argument is that the JSM and its radical offshoot, Juhayman’s Ikhwan
(Brotherhood), were among the first manifestations of a particular type of Saudi Islamism
that outlived Juhayman and has played an important yet subtle role in the shaping of the
country’s political landscape until today. It is characterized by a strong focus on ritual
practices, a declared disdain for politics, and yet an active rejection of the state and its
institutions.8 This so-called “rejectionist Islamism” is intellectually and organizationally
separate from the other and more visible forms of Saudi Islamist opposition such as the
so-called “awakening” (al-Sahwa) movement or the Bin Ladin style jihadists.9
O P P O S IT IO N A N D IS L A M IS M IN S A U D I A R A B IA B E F O R E 1 9 7 9
There have been relatively few cases of violent opposition to the rule of the Al Sa↪ud
since the foundation of the third Saudi state by ↪Abd al-↪Aziz bin Sa↪ud in 1902. The first
and most violent was the so-called “Ikhwan revolt” of the late 1920s. The Ikhwan were
bedouin from major Najdi tribes such as ↪Utayba and Mutayr who had been religiously
indoctrinated and trained as a military force for use in the territorial expansion of the
nascent Saudi state. When the expansion reached the border of territories controlled
by the British colonial power, King ↪Abd al-↪Aziz called for an end to further military
campaigns. The Ikhwan, who had already grown critical of ↪Abd al-↪Aziz because of
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his use of modern technology and interaction with Westerners, were outraged by the
abandonment of jihad for reasons of realpolitik. Some of the Ikhwan leaders also had
personal political ambitions that were thwarted by Ibn Saud.10 They refused to lay down
their weapons and instead rebelled against their king. After a series of clashes, the
bedouin fighting force, led by Sultan bin Bijad and Faysal Al Dawish, shaykhs of the
↪Utayba and Mutayr tribes, was crushed at the battle of Sbila in 1929. Ikhwan members
who had remained loyal were later absorbed into the national guard.
The 1950s and 1960s witnessed a few episodes of leftist and communist unrest in the
kingdom, which reinforced the regime’s conviction that a reliance on religious forces
was the best means of social control. The accession to the throne of the Pan-Islamist King
Faisal in 1964 and the dynamics of the Arab Cold War further increased the budgets and
the influence of the religious establishment and Islamic organizations in Saudi Arabia.
This created a context favorable to the development of local brands of Islamism, from
which later movements of political–religious opposition would emerge.
At this time, two different types of Islamism developed in Saudi Arabia. One was
pragmatic, political, and elitist and became known as the Islamic awakening (al-s
.
ah
.
wa
al-Isla¯miyya), or just the Sahwa. This represented the mainstream of the Saudi Islamist
movement. On its margins emerged an isolationist, pietistic, and lower-class Islamist
phenomenon, which can be termed “rejectionist” or “neo-Salafi.” From the 1960s to
the 1990s, the two strains coexisted, representing relatively distinct ideological ap-
proaches and sociological phenomena, although the former remained politically and
numerically more significant. The Sahwa developed primarily on university campuses
after the arrival, from the late 1950s onward, of large numbers of members of the
Muslim Brotherhood fleeing persecution in countries such as Egypt and Syria. These
individuals—many of whom were academics or well-trained professionals—rapidly
became the backbone of the newly established Saudi education and media sectors. It
was partly through their impulse that the Sahwa gained momentum in Saudi universities
in the 1970s and 1980s, before spearheading the reformist Islamist opposition of the
early 1990s. Ideologically, the Sahwa represented a blend of the traditional Wahhabi
outlook (mainly on social issues) and the more contemporary Muslim Brotherhood
approach (especially on political issues). Politically, representatives of the Sahwa have
sought to reform the state’s policies without ever straightforwardly questioning the
state’s legitimacy.11
However, it is from the other Islamist strain—the rejectionist one—that Juhayman’s
movement emerged in the 1970s. In 1961, the Islamic University of Medina had been set
up under the leadership of Grand Mufti Muhammad bin Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh and the
later well-known ↪Abd al-↪Aziz bin Baz.12 Both of them were eager to inspire a broader
Wahhabi movement in the Hijaz, which for decades had enjoyed relative cultural and
religious autonomy. They therefore encouraged their students to engage in proselytizing
(da↪wa) and enforcement of religious laws (h
.
isba).
These developments coincided with the arrival of new ideological influences on the
Medinan religious scene, in particular that of Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (1914–
99). Al-Albani was a Syria-based scholar of Albanian origin who had been invited by
↪Abd al-↪Aziz bin Baz, then vice-president of the Islamic University of Medina, to
teach there in 1961. Al-Albani had become famous in Syria for identifying himself
with the medieval school of thought known as the ahl al-h
.
adı¯th (i.e., “the people of
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hadith”), which he claimed to revive. The ahl al-h
.
adı¯th had become known in the 8th
century for opposing the use of reason in religious rulings, insisting that only the Sunna
was to provide answers for matters not explicitly treated in the Qur↩an. Their scholars,
therefore, developed a particular interest in the collection and the study of hadith. Of the
four canonical law schools that were to emerge a century later, only the Hanbali school
followed a strict ahl al-h
.
adı¯th line. The late Hanbalis, however, increasingly tended to
imitate (taqlı¯d) former rulings by members of their school, instead of practicing their
own interpretation (ijtiha¯d) based on the Qur↩an and the Sunna. This was one of al-
Albani’s main reproaches to the Wahhabis, who claimed ijtiha¯d but tended to act as
Hanbalis, and, therefore, as madhhabı¯s (i.e., those who follow a particular school of
jurisprudence). Al-Albani, in return, rejected all the schools of jurisprudence, calling for
direct and exclusive reliance on the Qur↩an and the Sunna. Another of his reproaches
was that Wahhabis did not care enough about hadith. In return, he held his own views on
the authenticity and readings of certain hadith, and, therefore, his rulings sometimes ran
counter to well-established—and especially Wahhabi—beliefs, notably on ritual issues.
In his well-known book Sifat salat al-Nabi (Characteristics of the Prophet’s Prayer),
al-Albani presented several peculiar views on Islamic rituals, which raised controversy
with other scholars. Some say these controversies led to his expulsion from Medina in
1963, although the exact circumstances of his departure are unclear. Al-Albani would
nevertheless maintain a close relationship with the Saudi ulama throughout his life,
particularly with Ibn Baz. The teachings of the charismatic al-Albani were to have a
strong impact on the Saudi religious scene, not least because they formed the ideological
basis for the pietistic organization from which Juhayman’s rebels would emerge, namely,
al-Jama↪a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba.
A L -JA M A ↪A A L -S A L A F IY YA A L -M U H TA S IB A
The group known as al-Jama↪a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba took shape in Medina in the
mid-1960s. It was formed by a small group of religious students who for some time
had been proselytizing in the city’s poorer neighborhoods.13 Having been influenced
by al-Albani, they were driven by a general conviction that mainstream schools and
tendencies in the Muslim world at the time—including the official Wahhabism of the
Saudi religious establishment—needed to be purified of innovations and misperceptions.
They were also acting to counter the growing influence of other groups on the religious
scene in early 1970s Medina, particularly Jama↪at al-Tabligh, but also the Muslim
Brotherhood.14 Both of these aims—promoting a purified Wahhabism and providing
an alternative to existing forms of Islamic activism—were shared by some of the most
prominent religious scholars in Medina at the time, such as ↪Abd al-↪Aziz bin Baz and
Abu Bakr al-Jaza↩iri.15 The founding members of the JSM developed personal contacts
with these scholars and considered ibn Baz their shaykh.
The formation of the JSM was prompted by an episode known among the members
as “the breaking of the pictures” (taksı¯r al-s
.
uwar) which occurred in approximately
1965. The proselytizers had gradually come to see it as their duty to enforce religious
obligations and regulations in certain parts of Medina. This included destroying pictures
and photographs in public spaces. In the early 1960s, there was friction and even
minor clashes in Medina between these zealous conservatives and local residents.16 This
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vigilantism went unnoticed or ignored until a group of young activists were caught
smashing a large number of display windows showing female mannequins in the center
of Medina. Having inflicted serious damage on commercial property, the perpetrators
were arrested and imprisoned for approximately a week.17 This confrontation with the
police inspired the main activists to intensify and coordinate their efforts. Not long
after this incident, they decided to set up an organization under the name al-Jama↪a
al-Salafiyya (the Salafi group). They approached Ibn Baz to ask for his approval. He
greeted the initiative and suggested that they add the qualification al-muh
.
tasiba (“which
practices h
.
isba”) to the name of their group.18 Ibn Baz thus became the official spiritual
guide (murshid) of al-Jama↪a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba and appointed Abu Bakr al-
Jaza↩iri as his deputy.19 The JSM had no official executive leader but was governed by
a consultative council (majlis al-shu¯ra¯) of five or six members, which included four of
the founding members and al-Jaza↩iri.
The group gradually stepped up its activities and attracted an increasingly large num-
ber of followers in Medina. In the early 1970s, they set themselves up in a purpose-built
two-story building known as Bayt al-Ikhwan (House of the Brotherhood) located in
the poor neighborhood of al-Hara al-Sharqiyya in Medina, an area known for the strict
conservatism of its residents. Bayt al-Ikhwan became the natural assembly point and
administrative center for the JSM, as well as a forum for daily classes and weekly con-
ferences. It was administered by Ahmad Hasan al-Mu↪allim, a close friend of Juhayman
and a Yemeni former student at the Islamic university.
Over time, the JSM’s organizational structure became increasingly large and complex.
Special administrative groups were set up to coordinate practical matters. One group
(initially headed by Juhayman) specialized in organizing members’ travels, another in
reception of guests, and a third in organizing trips to the villages for “wandering travelers”
(al-musa¯firu¯n al-jawwa¯lu¯n) to preach and recruit new members.20 The JSM encouraged
its adherents to set up similar communities in other cities around the kingdom. By 1976,
the JSM had followers based in practically all major Saudi cities, including Mecca,
Riyadh, Jidda, Taif, Ha↩il, Abha, Dammam, and Burayda. All branches had a local
leader or contact person. Some branches, like the one in Mecca, were also based in
purpose-built houses.21
To determine the socioeconomic profiles of JSM members, we asked al-Huzaymi to
provide us with as much information as he remembered on members of the group. This,
combined with other sources, allowed us to gather basic demographic data on thirty-five
individuals, which enabled us to make a few important overall observations.22 First, it
seems that most members were young, unmarried men. Some members did have families,
but no women played any direct role in the organization. Adherents covered a relatively
wide age span—from late teens to late forties—but the majority seem to have been in
their mid 20s. Second, most JSM members came from marginalized or discriminated
backgrounds. Many were recently urbanized young men with a badawı¯ (translated as
bedouin23 ) background.24 Historically, tribes have largely been considered the losers of
the Saudi modernization process, both in political terms (at the collective level) and in
economic terms (at the individual level).25 Other JSM members were residents of foreign
origin (with and without Saudi citizenship), mostly from Yemen.26 It is no secret that
foreigners have long suffered a degree of social and political, if not necessarily economic,
discrimination in Saudi society.27 The refusal of JSM members, for ideological reasons,
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to take government positions often contributed to their marginalization. They were,
therefore, often described by outside observers at the time as “unemployed,” “shop
assistants,” or “students.”28
Ideologically, the JSM was initially focused on moral and religious reform, not on
politics. In its view, Islam had been corrupted by the introduction of reprehensible inno-
vations (bid↪a) in religious practice and by society’s deviation from religious principles.
They advocated a return to a strict and literal reading of the Qur↩an and hadith as the sole
source of religious truth, and they rejected imitation (taqlı¯d) of all subsequent scholars,
including scholars that are revered in the Wahhabi tradition, such as Ibn Hanbal, Ibn
Taymiyya, and Ibn ↪Abd al-Wahhab. The JSM nevertheless held al-Albani in very high
esteem and organized teaching or lecture sessions with him whenever he came from
Jordan to Mecca on pilgrimage.29 They also had links to the Pakistani Ahl-e Hadith
through Shaykh Badi↪ al-Din al-Sindi, a Pakistani scholar based in Mecca who was one
of the JSM’s main religious references. There were also contacts between the JSM and the
Egyptian Salafi group Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya (Supporters of Muhammad’s
Tradition), whose monthly magazine, al-Tawhid, was widely read among JSM members
and whose shaykhs would lecture at Bayt al-Ikhwan during their trips to Medina.30
The JSM’s literal reading of religious texts led to an extreme social conservatism and
to a rejectionist attitude toward many aspects of modernity. For example, they opposed
the use of identity cards and passports because these denoted loyalty to an entity other
than God. They were against images of living beings, not only on television and in
photography but also on coins. More significantly, the JSM had peculiar views on ritual
and prayer, which set the group apart from other religious communities at the time. They
shared many of the interpretations presented by al-Albani in his book Characteristics of
the Prophet’s Prayer.31 For example, they argued that the condition for breaking the fast
during Ramadan was not the setting of the sun but the disappearance of sunlight, hence
fast could be broken during Ramadan in a room with closed windows. They considered
it permissible to pray while wearing sandals, which caused a certain amount of friction
with fellow worshippers in the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina. Bayt al-Ikhwan, therefore,
contained a mosque where the group’s adherents could worship according to their own
peculiar practices. Unlike other mosques, it contained no niche (mih
.
ra¯b), because the
JSM considered this an innovation (bid↪a).
The unorthodox practices of the JSM worried Medina scholars who had initially been
sympathetic to the group. Muqbil al-Wadi↪i, one of the JSM shaykhs, recalls being
summoned by two senior Medina-based scholars, ↪Atiyya Salim and ↪Umar Falata, who
questioned him on “twelve issues” which they deemed problematic.32 The relations
reached breaking point in the late summer of 1977, when a group of senior ulama led
by Abu Bakr al-Jaza↩iri—Ibn Baz had already left Medina at this point—visited Bayt
al-Ikhwan in the hope of convincing the members to relinquish their practices. They
held a meeting on the roof, during which Shaykh al-Jaza↩iri clashed with the hard-line
Juhayman al-↪Utaybi.33 The meeting ended with a split in the JSM: a minority—including
most of the historical leaders of the group—declared their loyalty to al-Jaza↩iri and left
Bayt al-Ikhwan, whereas a majority—comprising the youngest and most hotheaded
members—rallied around Juhayman and insisted on continuing their work. Muqbil al-
Wadi↪i recounts how he tried to mediate, unsuccessfully, between the two factions.
Al-Wadi↪i writes that Juhayman was being extremely distrustful and openly accused
fellow JSM members—including founding members of the group, such as Sulayman
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al-Shtawi—of being police informers.34 After the rooftop episode, Juhayman was left as
the only senior person and the natural leader of the smaller and radicalized JSM. From
then on, Juhayman’s name became synonymous with the organization, and he and his
followers simply referred to themselves as ikhwa¯n (brothers).
JU H AY M A N ’S IK H W A N
When Juhayman bin Muhammad bin Sayf al-↪Utaybi rose to the fore as an Islamist
leader in the mid-1970s, he was already in his forties. However, many questions remain
about his early life. What we do know is that he was born in the early or mid 1930s
to a bedouin family in the Ikhwan settlement (hijra) of Sajir in the western part of
the Najd region. Juhayman’s family belonged to the Suqur branch of the large ↪Utayba
tribe. The young Juhayman was raised in a very traditional bedouin environment. His
grandfather, Sayf al-Dhan, was a horseman who participated widely in bedouin raids
before the emergence of the Saudi state under King ↪Abd al-↪Aziz.35 Contrary to claims
by some historians, Juhayman’s grandfather was not involved in the Ikhwan revolts.
According to al-Huzaymi, it was Juhayman’s father, Muhammad bin Sayf, who fought
beside the rebel leader Sultan bin Bijad. Muhammad survived the battle of Sbila in 1929
and lived until 1972. Juhayman was proud of his father’s exploits and was keen to evoke
the memory of the old Ikhwan to his comrades in the JSM.36
Juhayman left school very early. Al-Huzaymi says Juhayman himself admitted having
completed only the fourth year of primary school. The widespread rumors of his illiteracy
seem to be at least partially true. Al-Huzaymi says he never saw Juhayman write—
and that the latter’s spoken classical Arabic was poor and colored by bedouin dialect.
The so-called “letters of Juhayman” were dictated to a friend acting as a scribe, al-
Huzaymi says. However, as Joseph Kechichian has rightly pointed out, Juhayman was
clearly not illiterate, given his command of religious literature and his authorship of
several works in classical Arabic.37 A likely explanation is, therefore, that Juhayman
was dyslexic, in other words academically and linguistically able but uncomfortable with
writing.
Juhayman spent the bulk of his working life in the national guard. By most accounts,
he joined in 1955 and left in late 1973, although he may have left earlier.38 His rea-
sons for leaving the guard are unclear; some sources say he left voluntarily whereas
others suggest that he was dismissed in humiliating circumstances. After leaving, he
moved to Medina, yet again for unknown reasons. Lacking formal school qualifications,
Juhayman never enrolled in the Islamic University of Medina, as many historians have
suggested. However, he did attend classes for a period at Dar al-Hadith, an old institution
specializing in the teaching of hadith, which is affiliated with the University of Medina.
It was during that time that he joined the JSM. Juhayman rose to prominence in the
JSM primarily because of his charisma, age, and tribal pedigree. It was particularly his
readiness to openly criticize the ulama that drew the admiration of younger members of
the organization.39 After the rooftop episode and the split in the JSM, Juhayman would
come to dominate the group to the extent that, according to al-Huzaymi, Juhayman’s
Ikhwan had many of the traits of a personality cult. The young members competed
for Juhayman’s favor and were socially ranked according to their relationship with and
proximity to the leader. Juhayman in return punished those who dared to argue with him
by ignoring them, which left them socially excluded from the group.40
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In December 1977, shortly after the rooftop episode, the authorities, who had received
reports of the group’s radicalization through former members, decided to take action.41
Police planned to raid Bayt al-Ikhwan and arrest Juhayman along with his associates.
However, Juhayman received a tip-off about the coming raid some hours in advance by
a police insider from the tribe of ↪Utayba.42 Juhayman left Bayt al-Ikhwan immediately
with two aides, one of whom was Nasir al-Huzaymi. He sought refuge in the desert,
where police jurisdiction was weaker and his bedouin allies more numerous than in the
cities. Juhayman stayed in the desert for almost two years, and he was not seen in public
again until the seizure of the Great Mosque in Mecca. Meanwhile, around thirty people
in Medina were arrested and imprisoned for six weeks under accusation of weapons
possession. In the days that followed, leading Juhayman associates in other cities were
also detained, although in smaller numbers.43
During these two years, Juhayman led a peripatetic life in the northern desert regions,
in a triangle-shaped area between Ha↩il, Burayda, and Hafr al-Batin. He was accompa-
nied at any given time by a small entourage of three to five people, but he maintained
contact with the rest of his followers. The police were continuously on his trail, and
there are many anecdotes about Juhayman’s secret ventures into inhabited areas. Shortly
after his escape into the desert, Juhayman wanted to visit his mother in his hometown of
Sajir but was prevented from doing so at the last minute when he received a tip-off that
the police were keeping her under surveillance. At one stage, Juhayman suffered from a
toothache, and after a long and painful wait, his aides managed to find a dentist who would
not inform the authorities. Meanwhile, secret meetings for his followers were held in
remote locations on a regular basis, although usually without Juhayman being present.44
After the police crackdown on Bayt al-Ikhwan, Juhayman no longer had a forum
in which to gather followers and communicate his ideas. Juhayman’s desert existence,
therefore, marked the starting point of his ideological production. He started recording
his ideas on cassette tapes and in pamphlets. None of the tape recordings is available
today, but his pamphlets have survived.45 They offer important insights into his thinking.
However, there has been much confusion about the total number, exact titles, and
real authorship.46 Although these pamphlets are commonly referred to as the “letters of
Juhayman,” only eight of them were actually signed by him, and, as he was uncomfortable
with writing, these had been dictated to his associates Muhammad al-Qahtani (the future
Mahdi) and Ahmad al-Mu↪allim, who transcribed them. It now seems clear that there are
twelve letters in total and that they were published in batches of one, seven, and four. One
is signed by al-Qahtani, one by a certain Yemeni named Hasan bin Muhsin al-Wahidi
and two by ah
.
ad t
.
alabat al-↪ilm (one of the seekers of knowledge), a pseudonym used
by another Yemeni called Muhammad al-Saghir.47
Of interest, the letters were printed in Kuwait by the leftist newspaper al-Tali↪a (the
Vanguard), whose owners were sympathetic to what they interpreted as a potential
working-class uprising in the Hijaz. A Kuwaiti JSM member named ↪Abd al-Latif al-
Dirbas had used his family connections to negotiate a deal with the leftist publisher. He
then coordinated the transport and distribution of several thousand copies of Juhayman’s
pamphlets across Saudi Arabia. Nasir Al-Huzaymi, who participated in the distribution
of the first letter in Mecca, recalls several anecdotes regarding the publishing process.
For example, the name of al-Tali↪a press had accidentally been printed on the front page
of each copy and had to be removed with scissors. Another problem emerged when the
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remarks from Shaykh Ibn Baz—to whom Juhayman had secretly presented the text for
approval—arrived only after the text had been printed. Hence, Ibn Baz’s remarks had to
be manually rubber-stamped onto each and every copy.48
The first letter was distributed in several cities simultaneously on 31 August 1978.49
The group of texts known as “the seven letters” was printed shortly afterward and
distributed during the hajj in November 1978. A few months later came another group
of four letters.50 The “seven” and the “four” letters were also presented to Ibn Baz, who
allegedly agreed with their content, except for the fact that they specifically targeted
Saudi Arabia.51 Their distribution angered the regime, which ordered new arrests within
the JSM. Among the individuals targeted was Muqbil al-Wadi↪i, who was accused of
being their author. He was released after three months and expelled to Yemen afterward.52
The letters were not only circulated across Saudi Arabia but also in Kuwait, where
the JSM gathered a relatively large following. A good indication of its growing presence
in Kuwait is the fact that ↪Abd al-Rahman ↪Abd al-Khaliq, the leading figure of the
mainstream Salafi movement in the Emirate, wrote a series of articles in the Kuwaiti
newspaper al-Watan in late 1978 refuting Juhayman’s ideas.53 It is also worth noting
that, on the day of the storming of the Mecca mosque, some of Juhayman’s letters were
distributed in Kuwaiti mosques.54
Juhayman’s letters are written in a relatively monotonous religious language and do
not reveal a particularly clear political doctrine. In the most political of his letters, “The
State, Allegiance and Obedience” (“al-imara wa-l-bay↪a wa-l-ta↪a”), Juhayman accused
the Saudi regime of “making religion a means to guarantee their worldly interests, putting
an end to jihad, paying allegiance to the Christians (America) and bringing over Muslims
evil and corruption.” He added that in any case, the Al Sa↪ud’s non-Qurayshi origin (i.e.,
not descendants from the Prophet Muhammad’s tribe) excluded them from the right to
Islamic leadership. This led him to the conclusion that the bay↪a (oath of allegiance)
that unites Saudis to their rulers is invalid (ba¯t
.
ila) and that obeying them is no longer
compulsory, especially on those very issues where their behavior and orders contradict
God’s word. He, therefore, called for his followers to keep away from state institutions
by resigning if they were civil servants or by leaving school or university if they were
still students.
He warned, however, that pronouncing takfı¯r (excommunication) upon rulers is pro-
hibited as long as they call themselves Muslims. He thus differentiated between the
state as an institution—which he deemed illegitimate and un-Islamic—and individual
members of the government—whom he refused to excommunicate. Likewise, Juhayman
was extremely critical of the official religious establishment as an institution, but he was
more careful in expressing opinions about specific scholars such as Ibn Baz.
On a more doctrinal level, Juhayman revived several important concepts from the
writings of hardline Wahhabi scholars from the 19th century such as Sulayman bin
↪Abdallah al-Shaykh and Hamad bin ↪Atiq.55 The first concept was that of millat Ibrahı¯m
(the community of Abraham), which is an allegory for the true Islamic community which
has disassociated from all forms of impiety. The second was awthaq ↪ura¯ al-ima¯n (the
strongest bonds of faith), meaning the links that unite Muslims with each other and
impose on them mutual solidarity. Both concepts converged in the principle of al-
wala¯↩ wa-l-bara¯↩ (allegiance to fellow Muslims and dissociation from infidels), which
Juhayman made the defining principle for correct Islamic behavior.
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Another important element in Juhayman’s ideology is that of the coming of the
Mahdi, the Islamic equivalent of the Messiah. The first of his “seven letters” is devoted
entirely to this theme.56 This text presents all the authentic hadiths about the Mahdi,
correlating them with recent events in the modern history of the Arabian Peninsula to
demonstrate the imminence of the Mahdi’s coming. In the same pamphlet, he wrote that
“we have dedicated all our efforts to this issue for the past eight years.”57 According to
al-Huzaymi, the issue of the Mahdi had indeed been talked about in the JSM all along,
but it only became a central part of Juhayman’s discourse in mid 1978, after his escape
into the desert. In late 1978, Juhayman declared that it had been confirmed to him in a
dream that his companion Muhammad al-Qahtani was the Mahdi.58 One of the reasons
why al-Qahtani was identified as such was that he possessed several of the Mahdi’s
attributes as described in the corresponding hadiths. First, he was called Muhammad
bin ↪Abdallah, as was the Prophet. Second, he claimed to belong to the ashra¯f, the
Prophet’s lineage.59 Third, his physical appearance was allegedly in conformity with the
descriptions of the Mahdi in religious tradition.60 The designation of al-Qahtani created
a second major split in the organization. Many members, including Nasir al-Huzaymi,
were unconvinced by the messianic talk and left the movement for good. It was this
remaining core of Juhayman’s followers who carried out one of the most spectacular
operations in the history of militant Islamism, the seizure of the Great Mosque in Mecca.
On 20 November 1979, the first day of the 15th century of the Islamic calendar, a group
of approximately 300 rebels led by Juhayman al-↪Utaybi stormed and seized control of
the great mosque in Mecca, the holiest place in Islam. Their aim was to have al-Qahtani
consecrated as the Mahdi between the black stone corner of the Ka↪ba (al-rukn al-aswad)
and Ibrahim’s station of prayer (al-maqa¯m) as tradition requires. The militants barricaded
themselves in the compound, taking thousands of worshippers hostage and awaiting the
approach of a hostile army from the north, as promised by the eschatological tradition.61
The situation developed into a two-week siege that left a hitherto unknown number of
people dead and exposed serious gaps in the Saudi crisis-response capability. The timing
of the attack was most likely determined by Juhayman’s belief in the Sunni tradition
of the “renewer of the century” (mujaddid al-qarn), according to which a great scholar
will appear at the beginning of each hijrι¯ century.62 Juhayman may have attempted to
blend the renewer tradition with the Sunni mahdist tradition and thus concluded that
the dawn of the new century was a propitious moment to consecrate al-Qahtani as the
Mahdi.63 The Mecca rebellion was thus entirely unrelated to the Shi↪i uprising, which
occurred almost simultaneously in the Eastern Province.64 However, the occurrence of
two internal uprisings in the space of a few months in 1979, as well as key international
events such as the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, certainly
affected the outlook of the Saudi political leadership.
Nasir al-Huzaymi, who had extensive conversations in prison with surviving rebels,
says that Juhayman’s group had begun collecting weapons in late 1978, approximately
a year before the attack. The main coordinator of weapons acquisition was Muhammad
al-Qahtani’s brother Sa↪id. He bought arms from Yemeni smugglers with money raised
by wealthier members of the group. In the months preceding the attack, they conducted
weapons training on various locations in the countryside outside Mecca and Medina.65
The rebels knew in advance that their operation might turn into a siege, and they,
therefore, placed approximately a week’s worth of food supplies (dried milk, dates, and
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bread) in the basement of the mosque complex shortly before the operation. Many also
brought radios, expecting to hear news of the approach and subsequent engulfment of
the hostile army from the north as promised by tradition. Al-Huzaymi’s account also
describes a rebel group perplexed by the death of Muhammad al-Qahtani already on
the third day of the siege. Some started having second thoughts, while others obeyed
Juhayman’s orders not to acknowledge al-Qahtani’s death. Even years after the events,
some JSM followers continued to believe that the Mahdi was still alive.66
On 4 December 1979, Saudi authorities regained control of the sanctuary with the
assistance of three French special-forces officers led by Captain Paul Barril. The rebels
were tried and sentenced with lightning speed. At dawn on 9 January 1980, sixty-
three people were executed in eight different cities around the kingdom. The list of
convicts, which had been published two days earlier in the Saudi press, included forty-
one Saudis, ten Egyptians, six South Yemenis, three Kuwaitis, a North Yemeni, an Iraqi,
and a Sudanese.67 However, the people executed do not necessarily represent the most
prominent members in Juhayman’s organization, but rather the individuals who fought
most fiercely in the final stages of the siege and survived. Al-Huzaymi explains that
prisoners underwent a quick medical examination to determine who would be executed.
Those with bruises or pains in their shoulders were assumed to have fired upon the
security forces and were punished by death. Those not executed received long prison
sentences. Saudi police also arrested a large number of people across the kingdom who
had been involved with the JSM or Juhayman’s Ikhwan at some stage. Those who
escaped arrest (or were released early) sought refuge in a variety of locations. Many
went abroad, particularly to Kuwait but also to Yemen. Others sought a quiet existence in
Riyadh or in conservative cities in the Najd, such as al-Zulfi and al-Rass.68 The bedouins
who had helped Juhayman were largely unaffected by the crackdown, and many of
them are still present in the northern desert regions. Within a few months of the Mecca
event, Juhayman’s organization had been almost completely dismantled, at least in Saudi
Arabia. The Kuwaiti branch of the movement survived and remained active until the end
of the 1980s, albeit in a form closer to the original JSM than to Juhayman’s Ikhwan.69
The Mecca event shook the regime, which was concentrating its political control on
leftist groups and never expected its foes to come from religious circles. It decided,
however, that only a reinforcement of the powers of the religious establishment and its
control on Saudi society would prevent such unrest from happening again. Ironically,
it was the other main Islamist current, the more institutionally integrated the Sahwa,
which benefited from these new policies and grew stronger throughout the 1980s until
it openly confronted the regime in the early 1990s.
IN T E R P R E T IN G JU H AY M A N ’S M O V E M E N T
Juhayman’s movement has been the subject of a significant number of analyses, some of
them outwardly political, others overly simplistic. One explanation, heard particularly—
but not only—from Saudi officials at the time, is that Juhayman’s movement was the
product of foreign ideological influences, mainly from Egyptian groups such as Shukri
Mustafa’s Jama↪at al-Muslimin (Society of Muslims), commonly known as al-Takfir
wa-l-Hijra (Excommunication and Emigration). These claims relied in part on the fact
that many of the people arrested after the event were Egyptian citizens, as were ten of the
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sixty-three executed rebels. It is indeed beyond doubt that there were Egyptian al-Takfir
wa-l-Hijra members in Saudi Arabia in the mid-1970s.70 However, al-Huzaymi insists
that the Egyptian element in the JSM was negligible and that most of the arrested Egyp-
tians had joined the rebellion immediately before the seizure of the mosque. He admits
that in 1976–77 there were a handful of individuals in the JSM who held takfı¯rı¯ positions,
but they changed their minds after Shaykh al-Albani sat down with them during one of his
visits to Medina and convinced them otherwise.71 The most important foreign ideological
influence on the JSM came not from Egyptian extremist groups but from al-Albani’s ahl
al-h
.
adı¯th school of thought. If the JSM had contact with foreign organizations, it was pri-
marily the Pakistani Ahl-e Hadith and the Egyptian Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya,
both of which are apolitical, nonviolent movements. Hence these foreign contacts do
not in any way explain the political radicalization and activism of Juhayman, whose
movement must be understood primarily as a domestic Saudi phenomenon.
Among the interpretations of the Mecca episode found more often in academic lit-
erature is the view that Juhayman’s rebellion was essentially a modern replay of the
1920s Ikhwan revolt.72 The memory of the original Ikhwan certainly had an influence
on Juhayman, who liked to tell his father’s stories at JSM gatherings. There are also a
few references to the early Ikhwan in Juhayman’s letters, for example when he writes,
“We wish to clear of all suspicions our ‘Ikhwan’ brothers who conducted jihad in the
name of God and were faithful to it, while this State and its evil scholars presented them
as Kharijites, to the extent that one can now find people to whom the issue is so unclear
that they don’t even ask God to grant them His mercy.”73 However, many of the JSM’s
members were not bedouin, and many among the bedouin in the JSM did not come
from tribes that were prominent in the first Ikhwan revolt. It would, therefore, be far
too simplistic to explain Juhayman’s rebellion as a resurgence of old tribal grievances
against the Al Sa↪ud. Restoring the honor of the first Ikhwan was only one minor aspect
of the group’s message. Despite their reactionary positions, the JSM and Juhayman’s
Ikhwan were essentially a modern phenomenon to be understood within the context of
1970s Saudi Arabia, a society undergoing rapid socioeconomic change and a steady
process of politicization.
Another frequently heard explanation is that Juhayman and his followers were apoc-
alyptics who had drifted so far in their belief in the Mahdi that they had lost their sense
of political rationality. It seems relatively clear now that Juhayman’s personal belief in
the Mahdi was genuine and that this was indeed a major factor behind the takeover of
the Mecca mosque. At the same time, Nasir al-Huzaymi insists that some of Juhayman’s
companions did not believe in the messianic dimension of his ideology. These individuals
chose to stay because they felt a strong sense of loyalty to the charismatic Juhayman and
to the group or because they were convinced of other aspects of the ideology, such as the
need for a religious and moral purification of society.74 Moreover, reducing Juhayman’s
Ikhwan to a messianic sect would ignore the political dimension of Juhayman’s discourse
as well as the question of why this movement gathered such strength at this particular
point in time. It seems, then, that we need to understand Juhayman’s group as being
simultaneously messianic and political.
A last interpretation, favored by the Arab left at the time of the attack, is that the Mecca
event represented a “people’s rebellion,” in which the disenfranchised Saudi working
class rose up against the rich Saudi elite. Days after the event, the Arab Socialist Labour
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Party in the Arabian Peninsula expressed its support for the rebels. Shortly afterward,
Nasir al-Sa↪id, the historic leader of the Arabian Peninsula People’s Union, described the
attack as part of a “people’s revolution” aimed at establishing a republic and adopting
democratic freedoms.75 He claimed that fighting had been going on in other places,
such as Tabuk, Medina, Najran, and parts of Najd—a version of the events adopted by
Alexei Vassiliev, among others.76 Al-Sa↪id’s allegation seemed so well informed that it
caught the attention of Saudi authorities, and on 17 December 1979 he mysteriously
disappeared in Beirut, never to reappear. Today, it is clear that his claims were not true.77
However, the leftists were to some extent right in pointing out that the rebels were for
the most part poor and disenfranchised. As noted earlier, Juhayman’s Brotherhood, as
the JSM before it, drew most of its members from the politically, economically, and
socially marginalized sections of Saudi society, particularly recently sedentary nomadic
tribes and residents of foreign origin.
As we have seen from this discussion, there is no simple explanation for the emergence
of Juhayman’s movement. A first and important step in the analysis is to distinguish
between the JSM on the one hand and Juhayman’s Brotherhood on the other. The
emergence of the JSM seems to be linked to three important societal changes in Saudi
Arabia in the 1960s and 1970s. The first was the slow but steady push toward increased
social conservatism from a religious establishment that sensed that it was losing its
grip on an increasingly liberal society. The second was the arrival of new ideological
currents that provided alternatives to the established political and religious order. The
third was the socioeconomic tensions resulting from Saudi Arabia’s rapid modernization
process. As for the emergence of Juhayman’s Brotherhood, it seems to have followed
a classic pattern of group radicalization, whereby a small faction breaks out of a larger
and more moderate organization after a process of politicization and internal debate.
After the break, the behavior of the radicalized faction is more determined by ideology
and charismatic leadership than by structural socioeconomic and political factors.
JU H AY M A N ’S L E G A C Y
It has long been assumed that Juhayman al-↪Utaybi and his movement represent an ex-
ceptional and rather short-lived phenomenon whose influence on the subsequent history
of Saudi Islamism has been rather limited. However, as we shall see, there are many
indications that the memory of Juhayman has been kept alive in certain Islamist circles
until today and that his ideology has inspired periodic attempts at reviving his movement.
Most prominent among Juhayman’s intellectual heirs is Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi
(aka ↪Isam Barqawi, b. 1959), a radical Islamist ideologue of Palestinian origin who grew
up in Kuwait. In the early 1980s, he started frequenting Islamist circles in Kuwait, where
he came in contact with the local JSM branch, whose ranks had swelled with the arrival
of remnants of the Saudi JSM in 1980.78 He became friends with Juhayman’s former
associate ↪Abd al-Latif al-Dirbas, who had come back from Saudi Arabia after being
released from prison.79 In 1981 or 1982, al-Maqdisi went to Medina to study religion,
during which time he made many contacts with former Juhayman sympathizers across
the kingdom.
Al-Maqdisi’s writings were heavily influenced by Juhayman’s ideology and con-
tained numerous references to Juhayman.80 However, al-Maqdisi was more radical than
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Juhayman on several issues. Most notably, al-Maqdisi did not hesitate to pronounce
takfı¯r upon Muslim rulers. In 1989, he wrote a book, al-Kawashif al-jaliyya fi kufr
al-dawla al-Sa↪udiyya (The Obvious Proofs of the Saudi State’s Impiety), in which
he praised Juhayman, while adding that “unfortunately, he [Juhayman] considered that
rebelling against these rulers, whatever they may do, . . . is contrary to the Sunna. . . .
Very unfortunately, he considered this government to be Muslim.”81
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi did not remain with the JSM for long as he kept arguing
with them over the issue of takfı¯r. Instead, he went to Peshawar in 1985 to join the Arab–
Afghan community, and he subsequently became one of the leading ideologues of the
so-called Salafi-Jihadi movement. However, he preserved his admiration for Juhayman,
and in the late 1980s he traveled regularly to Saudi Arabia, where he paid visits to
former friends of Juhayman in the Saudi desert.82 In the early 1990s, al-Maqdisi left
Peshawar and settled in Jordan, where he became the spiritual leader of a Jordanian
militant community. He was imprisoned in 1995 but has continued to write from his
cell. Recently, al-Maqdisi has attracted much attention for his open criticism of his
former pupil Abu Mus↪ab al-Zarqawi’s activities in Iraq.
The early 1990s witnessed a revival of Juhayman’s ideas in certain Islamist circles
in Saudi Arabia. The authors of the current article learned of the existence of a small
community of young Saudi Islamists in Riyadh in the early 1990s who saw themselves
as the continuation of Juhayman’s movement.83 The community had taken shape around
a core of three or four individuals in their early twenties who considered society in
general, and state education in particular, corrupt.84 They had broken with their families
and set themselves up in an apartment in the Shubra area of al-Suwaydi district in
Riyadh where they could study religion on their own. Their apartment, which aimed at
recreating Juhayman’s Bayt al-Ikhwan, was known as Bayt Shubra, and it soon became
a meeting place for like-minded youth. Although only five to ten people lived there at
any one time, many more attended informal lessons or dropped by for discussion and
socializing.
The residents of Bayt Shubra did not consider themselves part of an organization,
but rather “seekers of religious knowledge” (t
.
alabat ↪ilm). In their view, this knowl-
edge could not be found among the shaykhs of the religious establishment, whom
they considered corrupt, nor among the leaders of the Sahwa, whom they saw as too
political. Instead they looked to the writings of Juhayman, al-Maqdisi, and 19th-century
Wahhabi theologians such as Sulayman bin ↪Abdallah Al al-Shaykh. The residents of
Bayt Shubra greatly admired Juhayman and saw themselves as his ideological succes-
sors. Because none of them was old enough to have known Juhayman personally, they
sought out former members of the JSM in various parts of the country, particularly
among the bedouin in the desert.85 They also invited former JSM members in Riyadh to
lecture in Bayt Shubra. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi himself visited the apartment during
one of his visits to Saudi Arabia.86 The Bayt Shubra residents adopted the JSM’s extreme
social conservatism, strong emphasis on ritual matters, as well as its skepticism toward
the state and its institutions. Juhayman’s mahdist ideas, however, do not seem to have
been particularly important in Bayt Shubra, although some of its residents did accept
those ideas and continued to believe that the Mahdi had not died in 1979.
Over time, however, the Bayt Shubra community grew more and more interested in
politics, and its members would eventually take more radical positions than Juhayman
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on several questions. Although the Bayt Shubra community was initially inward looking
and apolitical, it was unable to avoid the political–religious debates of early 1990s
Saudi Arabia, a time when the confrontation between the state and the Sahwa was at its
most intense. The process of politicization introduced several disagreements, first (in
1992) on the issue of takfı¯r of the royal family and later (around 1994) regarding takfı¯r
of the religious establishment. Eventually, the Bayt Shubra network split into several
factions, each of which went its own way. The involvement of some former Bayt Shubra
members in the 1995 Riyadh bombings led police to try to arrest the entire network.
A few members managed to escape and found shelter with the very bedouin they had
earlier gotten to know through their fascination with Juhayman. The others were marked
by prison experience in different ways: some became more radical (several of them
subsequently went to Afghanistan) whereas others began a process of soul-searching
and went on to become liberal intellectuals.
Bayt Shubra was just one of many similar study circles that emerged throughout the
kingdom at the time. Although these groups remained relatively marginal compared
with the Sahwa—which was at its climax at this point—their very existence provides
two significant new insights about Islamism in Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s. First, the
ideology and example of Juhayman still had a significant appeal among young Saudis
ten years after the Mecca event, and second, the Sahwa did not have a monopoly on
the Islamist field. The Bayt Shubra residents shunned the Sahwa leaders (whom they
saw as too interested in politics) and sought knowledge and inspiration from a different
intellectual tradition. Among these communities, Bayt Shubra is historically the most
interesting because many of its residents later became well-known figures. Some became
prominent liberal writers, such as Mishari al-Dhayidi and ↪Abdallah al-↪Utaybi, whereas
others made names as militants. Bayt Shubra’s alumni include three of the four people
convicted for the November 1995 Riyadh bombing as well as some of the senior militants
involved in the terrorist campaign launched in 2003.87
C O N C L U S IO N : JU H AY M A N A L -↪U TAY B I A N D “R E JE C T IO N IS T
IS L A M IS M ” IN S A U D I A R A B IA
The study of Juhayman’s legacy has shown that the influence of Juhayman on the
development of Saudi Islamism is greater than generally assumed. Moreover, it has
allowed us to trace the origins and the development of a particular intellectual tradition
within Saudi Islamism, which categorically rejects the legitimacy of the state and its
institutions and which advocates withdrawal from the state’s sphere. This intellectual
tradition may be termed “rejectionist Islamism.” Saudi rejectionist Islamism bears some
similarity to other Islamist groups characterized by a withdrawal from society (such as
Shukri Mustafa’s Jama↪at al-Muslimin in Egypt), but it is first and foremost a Saudi
phenomenon to be understood within the dynamics of the Saudi political–religious
landscape. Although the JSM and the Bayt Shubra network have no doubt been two
of the most visible and politicized manifestations of this strain of Islamism, related
communities have existed—and still exist—in Saudi Arabia.88
Identifying a rejectionist strain in Saudi Islamism also makes it easier to distinguish
it from the better known phenomenon of “reformist Islamism,” as exemplified by the
Sahwa. The Sahwa consisted of prominent academics well integrated into the system,
118 Thomas Hegghammer and Ste´phane Lacroix
whereas the rejectionists attract the marginalized and avoid state education and em-
ployment altogether. They also clearly differ in their attitude toward the state: Sahwa
Islamists such as Salman al-↪Awda never openly question the state’s legitimacy, only
criticizing (although sometimes with virulence) its policies, which they strive to change
through nonviolent, institutional means.
The 1980s witnessed the emergence of a third strain of Saudi Islamism: jihadism,
which has its roots in the participation of thousands of Saudi youth in the Afghan jihad
against the Soviet Union. The jihadists developed a highly militaristic culture that set
them apart from other Islamist currents. They were also explicitly interested in politics,
which rejectionists were not. However, Saudi jihadists were initially politicized and
radicalized on issues of international politics, not on issues of domestic politics, like
their counterparts in other Arab countries. In 1990, Saudi jihadists were not openly
critical of the Saudi state.
In the first half of the 1990s, jihadists and rejectionists started to mix, as was the
case in the Bayt Shubra community. Although they represented two different cultures—
rejectionists being men of introspection and jihadists being men of action—their views
converged on many important issues. Most importantly, they influenced each other, as
many rejectionists became more interested in politics whereas the jihadists adopted the
rejectionists’ strong distaste for the Saudi state. By the late 1990s, many rejectionists
had joined the jihadists and left for Afghanistan or elsewhere. By the early 2000s, the
growing polarization of the Saudi Islamist field between reformists and jihadists left
little room for the rejectionists. Juhayman’s intellectual legacy had effectively been
eclipsed—but the memory of his rebellion was more in vogue than ever.
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